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THE MOTION IN LIMINE -A USEFUL PROCEDURAL
DEVICE
Candace C. Fetscher
The motion in limine, or motion to exclude, is relatively unknown
to legal scholars but is used with increasing frequency by those who
are engaged in the courtroom practice of law. Its purpose, in gen-
eral, is the exclusion of prejudicial matter in advance of its mention
in court by means of a judicial determination as to its admissibility.
This note will attempt to define the motion as it is used in other juris-
dictions, but with particular reference to its use in Montana district
courts.
MOTION IN LIMINE DEFINED
Black's Law Dictionary defines in limine as follows: "On or at the
threshold; at the very beginning; preliminarily."' Of the legal diction-
aries, only Anderson's2 gives much indication of the meaning of this
phrase as it is used with regard to the motion it describes: "In limine.
At the threshold: at first inception; at first opportunity. An objection
to testimony must be offered in limine."
The motion in limn .e is perhaps best defined in the cases; it is a
practical, commonsense innovation and is appropriately a part of the
working law. For example, the court in Bituminous Casualty Corpora-
tion v. Martin' said, "The only purpose of the motion [in limine] and
order was to prevent the asking of prejudicial questions and the making
of prejudicial statements in the presence of the jury." Thus, this motion
has as its object the exclusion of material which might, by its mere
mention, result in prejudice on the part of the jury. As most attorneys
recognize, curative instructions and sustained objections to improper
questions often merely call more attention to the offending evidence,
thus emphasizing its prejudicial effect.4 The use of a motion to exclude
any mention of such matters allows the trial to proceed with less chance
of error.
The time for the making of a motion in limine appears to vary from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. One would suppose, from its Latin label,
that the motion must be made in advance of trial; but that is not neces-
sarily the case, especially in Montana (see discussion infra). Some
1BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY REVISED, 896 (4th ed. 1968). This definition, with little
variation, appears in the other legal dictionaries: TAYLOR'S LAW GLOSSARY, 26 (4th
ed. 1855), "In or at the beginning; at the threshold"; WHARTON'S LAW LEXICON,
446 (13th ed. 1925); "At the outset, preliminary"; BouvIF_'s LAw DICTIONARY,
1522 (Rawle's Revision, 8th ed. 1914), "In or at the beginning." This phrase is
frequently used: ". . . as, the courts are anxious to check crimes in limine."'
2ANDERSON'S DICTIONARY Or LAW, 530 (1893).
'Bituminous Casualty Corporation v. Martin, 78 S.W.2d 206, 208 (Tex. 1972).
'See Broeder, The University of Chicago Jury Project, 38 NEB. L. REv. 744, 754.
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descriptions of the motion mention that it must be made before the
beginning of trial. For example:
... it is a motion, heard in advance of jury selection, which asks the
court to instruct the defendant, its counsel and witnesses not to
mention certain facts unless and until permission of the court is
first obtained outside the presence and hearing of the jury.'
From its denomination, it is clear that the motion in limine is to be
made at the beginning of or before something-and that thing is usually
an attempt to offer evidence, especially testimonial evidence. Thus, this
motion is made before evidence is offered; and its object is usually a
court order prohibiting the attempt to offer evidence or to ask a par-
ticular question of a witness.
ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE MOTION
From the way in which it is used, the motion in limine appears to be
related to the Motion to Suppress in criminal trials. Some commentators
feel that use of the motion to suppress gave rise to a related motion
to exclude, or motion in limine:
Whatever may be the ultimate scope of the motion to suppress, a
device similar to it but not controverting the 'legality' of the dis-
puted evidence has made its appearance in the reports of both civil
and criminal cases. This related device is as yet insufficiently liti-
gated to have received a name by which it is universally known,
but its purpose well characterizes it: to secure a ruling at some time
before an item of prejudicial evidence is actually offered that it is
inadmissible and will be excluded.'
The motion in limine can be distinguished from the motion to sup-
press in that the former is discretionary, dealing with a balancing of
relevancy against prejudice, while the latter is based on a constitutional
argument for Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights.
A speaker at the Nebraska Institute on Evidence said that these
motions were first used in Texas,7 but another commentator identifies
an Alabama case as the first attempted use of the motion in limine.8
This author goes on to say:
It is perhaps characteristic of the motion's infancy that it has not
yet received a name by which it is universally known .... In Texas,
pretrial exclusionary procedures are referred to as 'motions in
limine'. . . . Elsewhere, they are variously referred to as 'motions
ad limine,' 'motions to suppress,' and 'motions to exclude."'
Although most of the cases construing use of motions in limine
come from Texas and other southwestern jurisdictions, use of the motion
5Davis, Motions in Limine, 15 OLEv-MAR. L. R. 255 (1966).
OAnnot., 94 A.L.R.2d 1087, 1090 (1964).
7Holtorf, Motions to Limit Evidence, Institute on Evidence, Nebraska State Bar
Association, 46 Nan. L. REV. 502, 503 (1966).
6Love, Pretrial Exclusionary Evidence Buling, 1967 Wis. L. REV. 738, citing Bradford
v. Birmingham Electric Company, 227 Ala. 285, 149 So. 729 (1933).
1d. at 739 and note 9.
1974]
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is spreading rapidly.' 0 This kind of usage has been condoned in many
jurisdictions and even by the United States Supreme Court. In Eichel
v. New York Central Railroad Co.," the Court in a per curiam opinion
held that the trial court had properly excluded a letter written by the
plaintiff making reference to disability pension payments. In an opinion
concurring in part and dissenting in part, Mr. Justice Harlan wrote:
Whether or not evidence that the petitioner was receiving disability
pension payments... should have been admitted depends on a balance
between its probative bearing on the issue as to which it was offered
. . . and the possibility of prejudice to the petitioner resulting from
the jury's consideration of the evidence on issues as to which it is
irrelevant. When a balance of this sort has to be struck, it should,
except in rare instances, be left to the discretion of the trial judge,
subject to review for abuse .... It Is he who is in the best position
to weigh the relevant factors, such as the value of the disputed
evidence as compared with other proof adducible to the same end
and the effectiveness of limiting instructions."
Use of the motion in limine in Texas is described in more detail
as follows:
Motions in limine seek to enforce rights accorded by law. Where
counsel for one party anticipates action by opposing counsel, and
such anticipated action is in violation of the rules of either proce-
dure or evidence, a motion in limine will prevent that action from
occurring before the jury. [Motions in liminel may be filed, con-
sidered, and granted on the day of trial, even though a pretrial hear-
ing had been previously ordered and held."8
Thus, the origin of the motion in limine, as well as its accepted
method of use, appear unclear; the power by which it is heard and
granted (or refused) is equally unclear. Few judges or commentators
agree among themselves as to the source of authority from which these
motions issue, although the majority appear to find ample power and
authority for their use in the inherent power of the judiciary to dispose
of questions of law, and in exercise of judicial discretion for this pur-
pose.14 Others find implied powers in various rules of procedure. For
IODavis, supra note 5, at 257, "The in limine practice is rapidly growing in Texas
and has been at least suggested elsewhere," citing Crawford v. Hite, 10 S.E.2d 561
(Va.Sup.Ct. of Appeals (1940); Cook v. Philadelphia, 414 Pa. 154, 199 A.2d 446
(1964); Liska v. Merit Dress, 250 N.Y.S.2d 691, 43 Misc.2d 285 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
"Eichel v. New York Central Railroad Co., 375 U.S. 253 (1963).
'Id. at 256.13Bruder, Pretrial Motions in Texas Criminal Cases, 9 HousroN L. REv. 641, 653, and
642 (1972) citing Barbee v. State, 432 S.W.2d 78 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968) cert. denied
385 U.S. 924 (1969).
14Davis, supra note 5 at 257 writes, "The power of the trial court to grant such a
motion is inherent in its right to admit or exclude evidence and will probably not
be specificially mentioned in the procedural rules."
Love, supra note 9 at 746-747 writes:
Although an increasing number of courts now do recognize the motion 's legitimacy,
there are still no state or federal statutes which expressly create a pretrial pro-
cedure for excluding inadmissible evidence. Consequently, the authority for
making such pretrial rulings at formal hearings has been held to proceed from
the trial court's inherent power to admit or exclude evidence.
The motion to suppress is a recognized procedure for excluding constitutionally in-
admissible evidence. See, for example, RzvisED CODE S o MONTANA, §§ 95-1805 and
95-1806 (1947).
[Vol. 35
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example, ". . . the general catchall provisions of rules authorizing pre-
trial conferences and orders contemplate the type of 'coercive rulings'
required by a motion in limine. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16 and
its progeny can be so construed."'15 "In addition, those rationales that
have been used to justify judicial innovation and rulings in pretrial
conferences, motions for summary judgment, and motions to suppress
can be used to legitimize the in limine process."'16
It is true that there is no clear reference in the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure to motions in limine or motions to exclude. It appears
that there is, however, implied authority, as mentioned, especially in the
authority of the court to make pretrial orders on the basis of pretrial
conferences under Rule 16. Furthermore, there may be implied author-
ity under the proposed Rules of Evidence. Rule 403 in particular allows
the exclusion of needlessly prejudicial evidence. 1 7 The procedure may
also be condoned under Rule 104 of these proposed rules, which pro-
vides that the determination shall be made by the judge out of the
hearing of the jury.'8 "Even those courts which have held that their
own comprehensive statutory scheme prohibits considering motions in
limine on certain matters, have recognized that a judge has the inherent
and discretionary power to consider some pretrial evidentiary exclu-
sions."' 9
We have seen, then, that motions in limine, sometimes called motions
to exclude, are recognized, formally or informally, in a number of juris-
dictions. Although this usage appears to have originated in Texas and
other southern and southwestern jurisdictions, motions in limine have
not been confined to that area. As early as 1937, a similar motion to
exclude a prejudicial and irrelevant question was sustained on appeal
by the Washington supreme court in State v. Smith.20 In that case the
prejudice consisted in asking a previously prohibited question as to
the defendant's discharge from the Marine Corps (which happened to
have been dishonorable). It is interesting to note that the dissent in
this case thought that the motion to exclude was "shrewd and erron-
eous." 2' The same court in the same year, while not overruling Smith,
5Rothblatt and Leroy, The Motion in Lininie in Criminal Trials: A Technique for
the Pretrial Exclusion of Prejudicial Evidence, 60 Ky. L. J. 611, 614 (1972).
"Id. at 615 citing Love, supra note 9 at 746.
-56 F.R.D. 183, 218 Rule 403:
EXCLUSION or RELEVANT EVIDENCE ON GROUNDS OF PREJUDICE, CONFUSION, OR WASTE
or TIME.
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading
the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation
of cumulative evidence.
"Id. at 196.
IRothblatt and Leroy, supra note 15 at 614, citing State v. Hawthorne, 228 A.2d 682,
688 (N.J. 1967).
"nState v. Smith, 189 Wash. 422, 65 P.2d 1075 (1937).
zId. at 1079.
19741
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held that: "Whether or not the trial court will consider any such ques-
tion in advance of the actual offer of evidence rests within the sound
discretion of the court.
22
An often-cited case in connection with motions in limine is Bridges
v. City of Richardson, another Texas case, in which the court said:
The use of a motion in limine is appropriate and desirable . . . to
eliminate, in advance of trial, the possibility of any prejudicial
testimony being offered before the jury .... The very purpose of
the use of the in limine motion is to enlighten the court, as well as
adverse counsel, of the specific nature of the anticipated testimony
which should not be offered.'
Motions in limine were similarly approved in State v. Wise 24 (1966) in
Arizona and Wagner v. Larson (1965) in Iowa.25  As proof that the
motion is not universally approved, however, we have State v. Flett,26 a
1963 Oregon case involving a manslaughter conviction, in which the
court held, "There is no occasion, prior to trial, to seek test rulings
from the trial court upon questions of the admissibility of oral evidence
that may or may not be offered. 21 7
A recent Indiana case, Burrus v. Silhavy,28 includes rather extensive
treatment of the motion in limine, upholding its use against the specifi-
cation of error that the motion was not a creature of statute nor was
it found in the Indiana Rules of Procedure. In that case the motion
was used to preclude mention of an insurance payment to the plaintiff.
The court held:
'Motions in limine' are a part of the Indiana practice. The trial
court's authority to entertain 'motions in limine' emanates from its
inherent power to admit and exclude evidence. This inherent power
to exclude extends to prejudicial questions and statements that
could be made in the presence of a jury and thereby interfere with
fair and impartial administration of justice.'
EState v. Morgan, 192 Wash. 425, 73 P.2d 745, 747 (1937).
2Bridges v. City of Richardson, 349 S.W.2d 644, 647-648 (Tex. Civ. 1961) aff'd 354
S.W.2d 366 (1962). It is to be noted that the decision here approved denial of a
motion in limine on the ground of vagueness.
2State v. Wise, 101 Ariz. 315, 419 P.2d 342 (1966).
25Wagner v. Larson, 257 Iowa 1202, 136 N.W.2d 312 (1965).
"State v. Flett, 234 Or. 124, 380 P.2d 634, 637 (1962), (Annotated, 94 A.L.R.2d
1087, note 6 supra).
2Id. at 637. The court in this case did not, however, condemn the use of motions in
Limine. At 636 it said:
When highly prejudicial evidence is offered, its relevancy, i.e., its tendency to
prove an issue in dispute, must be weighed against the tendency of the offered
evidence to produce passion and prejudice out of proportion to its probative
value . . . the matter is largely within the sound discretion of the trial court.
And at 637:
If the trial judge desires to have an informal conference with counsel prior to
trial in order to minimize possible hazards that might lead to a mistrial, or in
other ways to expedite the taking of testimony, that is a matter of discretion
with the individual judge. We have found no authority, however, which requires
the court to submit to a dress rehearsal in which the defendant may explore the
state's evidence and the court's rulings thereon out of the presence of the jury
in preparation for the trial itself.
"Burrus v. Silhavy, ...... Ind ........ , 293 N.E.2d 794 (1973).
nId. at 798.
[Vol. 35
5
Fetscher: The Motion In Limine--A Useful Procedural Device
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1974
NOTES
USE OF MOTIONS IN LIMINE IN MONTANA
A survey of district judges in Montana s0 shows that motions in
limine are in use in nearly all of the judicial districts of the state. In
January, 1974, a Montana supreme court decision recognized and upheld
the use of a motion in limine. Kipp v. Wong,3' which originated in Yel-
lowstone County, was a negligence action against a tavern owner by a
patron who was injured when an unruly person also present in the
tavern shot him, along with two others. The court granted a motion
in limine excluding testimony of one witness, Smith, who had seen the
assailant, Gardiner, in the alley near the bar earlier in the evening
during a fight. The excluded testimony related to Smith hearing a shot
in the alley after his return to the bar. This witness was allowed,
however, to testify to Gardiner's poor reputation for peace and quiet in
the community. The court, per Mr. Justice Daly, held:
We concur with the trial court's view that plaintiff failed to demon-
strate the probative value or relevance of this offered evidence. Wefind the trial court acted reasonably and within its sound discretion
in granting the pretrial motion to exclude, in examining witness
Smith outside the presence of the jury, and in excluding portions
of Smith's testimony relating to gunshot sounds."
It is important to note that both the brief for appellant and the
brief for respondent in Kipp recognized the existence of motions in
limine, although they differed as to the requirements for making them.83
With this case the supreme court officially recognizes the use of these
motions and seems to approve the oral making of the motions and their
use during as well as before trial.
In March, 1974, the Montana supreme court again upheld the
granting of a motion in limine in Wallin v. Kinyon Estate,83.1 in which
a will was admitted to probate over the contention that the drawer of
the will was practicing law without a license and had unduly influenced
the testator. Since the will complied with all statutory requirements,
the motion in limine was granted excluding any mention of the qualifi-
cations of the public administratrix who drew the will. The supreme
court held that the district court had properly granted the motion and
a directed verdict admitting the will to probate, and even went so far
as to find that the court had properly denied a continuance on the
basis of surprise, the motion having been filed the day before trial.
1'Survey by this writer, January-February, 1974. Of 28 questionnaires sent to all
Montana district judges and 25 returned, 23 indicated that the motion in limine was
used at some times in the district court. The remaining 2 indicated that the motion
in limine had been used once in several years.
"Kipp v. Wong, ...... Mont ....... 517 P.2d 897 (1974).
3id. at 901.
3Kipp v. Wong, supra note 31, unpublished brief for appellant, pp. 11-13, citing 94
A.L.R.2d 1088, 1098 and Mont. Rule. Civ. PRoc. 35 (b) (2); unpublished brief for re-
spondent, pp. 29-31, citing Sacramento and San Joaquin Drainage District v. Reed,
29 Cal. Rptr. 847, 852-853 (Cal. App. 1963), and Jangula v. United States Rubber
Co., 147 Mont. 98, 111, 410 P.2d 462, 468 (1966).
"'Wallin v. Kinyon Estate, ...... Mont ......., 519 P.2d ......, 31 St. Reptr. 256 (1974).
1974]
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In approving the granting of the motion in limine in Wallin, M1r.
Justice Haswell wrote for the court as follows:
Authority for the granting of a motion in limine rests in the
inherent power of the court to admit or exclude evidence and to
take such precautions as are necessary to afford a fair trial for all
parties. People v. Jackson, 95 Cal. Rptr. 919, 18 Cal. App. 3d 504.
Rule 16(6), M.R.Civ. P., permits the court in its discretion to consider
'* * * matters as may aid in the disposition of the action.' * * *
The decision of the district court in excluding questions at trial
of the proponent's alleged practice of law was conducive to the pre-
vention of irrelevant, immaterial and prejudicial evidence being
heard by the jury.':'
Thus, in this decision the court has specified exactly the source
of the authority for the granting of motions in limine and has approved
their use even more clearly than in Kipp.
RESULTS OF SURVEY
From the survey of district court judges, it appears that the
motion in limine has been used in some jurisdictions for several years-
twenty or more-while it is a relatively new development in others.3 4
The manner in which the motion is permitted also varied from district
to district and sometimes within a district from judge to judge. The
following results were obtained as to manner of use:
Allowed during the trial .................................................................... . 12
Allowed on the day of trial before trial has begun .......................... 8
Allowed until the day before trial .......................................................... 1
Allowed until 5 days before trial ............................................................ 1
It was mentioned by some judges that they thought that the motion
was to be allowed whenever it appeared to be necessary and was
made in a timely manner.
None of the judges indicated that they would refuse to accept and
consider such a motion."
The survey also revealed that although its usage varies from dis-
trict to district,8 6 the motion in limine is used to some extent nearly
1'-Id. at ...... ; St. Reptr. 259-60.
"The survey indicates the following history of use:
Five years or less ................................................................................................... 7
Ten years .............................................................................................................. 3
Fifteen years .......................................................................................... . . . ...... . . .  5
Twenty years or more ............................................................................................ 6
1Survey, see note 30.
"Survey, see note 30:
% Used In All Trials In Civil Trials In Criminal Trials
95% 1
50% 2 2 1
45% 1
40% 1 1
30% 2 1
25% 3 2
20% 1 3 1
10% 4 2 1
5% 3 5 4
1-2% 1 4 4
-1% 4 4 (4 districts do not use
motions in linine in crim-
inal eases at all.)
[Vol. 35
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everywhere in the state. In many jurisdictions, motions in limine appear
to be used only in civil trials.
In response to a question as to the sanction of the motion in limine,
nearly all judges replied that they thought that it was permitted as
within the proper discretion of the judiciary or from inherent judicial
power to prevent error in a trial. The following other sources of
authority, however, were also mentioned:
Rules of Evidence in general,
Rule 7(b),
Rule 16 (and Uniform Rule #1 thereunder, providing for determin-
ation of legal questions in advance of trial),
Rule 30(b) and (d),
Rule 43(c), and
Rule 47(a).
Nearly all judges felt that the use of motions in limine helped to
do away with any element of surprise and that they were most useful
in the prevention of prejudice and in clarifying use of evidence. All
favored the continued use of the motion, although one judge thought
it should be used only rarely to avoid abuse. Most (16) felt that the
motion was most useful as it now exists, i.e., to be used at the judge's
discretion without regulation by rule; but a few favored clarification
by rule as to official recognition of the motion and proper time and
manner of making the motion.
In sum, then, the motion in limine is a trial technique recognized and
permitted in the state of Montana. As a result of Kipp and Wallin, this
motion may see expanded usage in the state, although it appears that no
judges will allow it to be abused as a dilatory motion or a tactical harrass-
ment. All judges who respond to this motion do so in the belief that it is a
good way of achieving a more orderly trial and one more free from
error, thus serving judicial economy in the long run by avoiding mis-
trials and by minimizing appeals.
SUGGESTED USES FOR MOTIONS IN LIMINE
Although the motion in limine may be adapted to any situation in
which prejudicial evidence should be held either automatically inadmis-
sible or so inflammatory that its relevance is outweighed, the commenta-
tors suggest several common uses for the motion. The following sug-
gested uses would exclude any mention of:
1. Drug addicition, alcoholism, violence, or personal habits un-
related to the trial issues or to a witness's ability to observe
and testify;
2. Marital, economic, or health status;
3. Military release status;
4. Race or religion;
1974]
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5. Life insurance, social security, pensions, and other collateral source
matters, or
6. Prior claims, suits, or unrelated injuries.'
One example of a use often given is that of the wrongful death
action in which the surviving spouse has become engaged to marry
before the settlement of the suit. Although that marital status is irrele-
vant to the damages sustained or the question of negligence, its mention
before the jury could change the course of the trial. Thus, counsel for
the survivor should move in limine that counsel for the defendant make
no mention of the engagement.
CONCLUSION
Motions in limine, or motions to exclude, are a useful addition to
the equipment with which an attorney serves his client. In most cases
this motion aids the court in assuring the parties a fair, error-free trial.
It allows the judge, in many cases, the chance to give more than momen-
tary consideration to what may be a difficult or involved evidentiary
question. Although it might be helpful to set forth a rule permitting
such motions, the discretion now available to the judge should not be
limited since this is an area in which flexibility serves the ends of
justice rather than aiding any party in attaining an unfair advantage.38
Montana recognizes and uses motions in limine. Depending on the
judicial district, they can be oral or written, submitted before or during
trial. They may be more than mere motions to exclude; as motions
"on the threshhold," they may replace pretrial conferences and orders
in simple trials or supplement them in complex actions. This motion
is certainly one whose use should be considered by any attorney who
engages in litigation.
9
17See Rothblatt and Leroy, supra note 15 at 621-622; Davis, supra note 5, 259; Davis,
Motions In Limine, 12 THE JUDGES JOURNAL 61, 62 (1973).
MCompare the suggestions set forth by Love, supra note 8 at 747 and 750 as to codifi-
cation of pretrial motions to exclude in the interest of uniformity.
"Forms suggesting procedures for making motions in limine may be found in 94
A.L.R.2d 1087 at 1099; Rothblatt and Leroy, supra note 15 at 635-637 (1972); and
MORRILL, TRIAL DIPLOMACY, 219-220.
[Vol. 35
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